CS 55: Security and Privacy

Introduction; password cracking



Where are you located?

With great power comes great responsibility ...



William Lamb, 2nd Viscount Melbourne

We will cover some techniques that could land you in jail if you use them... be wise

OR

Spider Man's uncle Ben

Example: door entry

DO NOT show unless everyone agrees NOT to do this at Dartmouth!

Example: door entry



Example: door entry



Another example: door entry



Another example: door entry



Countermeasures?

Agenda

1. Course logistics

2. Passwords

We are meeting online this term

- We will use Zoom for class meetings during normal class hours (I will record and post each class session)
- We will see what works as we go, but here are some rules for starters:
 - Start with your camera on but microphone muted
 - If you would like to ask a question, use the "Raise hand" feature in Zoom, then when called on, ask your question and lower hand
 - We will make additional rules as we need them...
- I'll assume you've done the reading for the day, in class I'll expand/extend the material from the book, and will not simply repeat the book back to you
- A large portion of each day will be in-class discussions and demos on a live system

This class is about security and privacy; we will consider seven major topics

Seven main topics for the course:

- 1. Adversaries
- 2. Cryptography
- 3. Common attacks
- 4. Defensive tools
- 5. Security operations
- 6. Privacy and the law
- 7. The future

This course is <u>NOT</u>:

- A course on how to hack
 - We will implement attacks to understand how they work
 - We will also discuss countermeasures

A course for script kiddies!

- There are hundreds (thousands?) of scripts you can run to implement attacks without understanding how they work
- We will write our own code
- I'll assume you know Python and C

We will <u>not</u> cover many network attacks

• CS60 is not a prereq

Assessment is based on five labs, two exams, and class participation

Syllabus: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~tjp/cs55

partners

ASSESSMENT		Notes:
10	Class participation	Readings from <i>Security in</i>
<i>ا</i> ر	Two exams	Pfleeger, and Margulies
	 Midterm and final Each worth 20% 	Laptop use in class is encouraged required – Google is your friend
50	Five labsEach worth 10%Will work with two randomly assigned	

NOTE: Lab 0 is simply to gather information

We will also be using Canvas and Slack for announcements and help

Online resources

Canvas

- Course announcements
- Lab submissions

Slack

- We will use Slack in place of Piazza
- Sign up via link on left side of Canvas
- Ask questions, but do not post solutions related to the labs or the exams

Lab 0 is out now

Lab 0

- Find it on Canvas
- Take course survey to understand your background
- Set Virtual Box and VM we will use for experiments
- Read and acknowledge course policies



Survey: your background

My background

What is the difference between security and privacy?



1. Course logistics





Source: https://xkcd.com/936/

Discussion:

- 1. What is the difference between identification and authentication?
- 2. What are some of the problems with using passwords for authentication?
- 3. How do adversaries crack passwords?

Do not store passwords in plain text!

Use hashing to avoid storing passwords in plaintext



Hash function is a deterministic mathematical one-way trap door

- Collision resistant different plaintext do not produce same hash digest
- Choose hash functions that take a long time to computer (e.g., bcrypt)
- Cannot find plain text in "reasonable" amount of time given only the hash digest
- Or can we?

DO NOT store user passwords in plain text!

UserID	UserName	UserPassword	Do not store	
1	testuser	password	passwords in	
2	testuser1	password	plain text	
3	testuser2	password1		
4	testuser3	my secret password		
	Hash Password	Note: same password results in same hash	If adversary step passwords, can read plain-text password	als not
UserID	UserName	HashedPassword		Instead store
1	testuser	5f4dcc3o5aa765d61d	8327deb882cf99	nassword
2	testuser1	5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d	8327deb882cf99	password
3	testuser2	7c6a180b36896a0a80	02787eeafb0e4c	

On log in: hash plain text password and compare with database





Hash user's plain text password and look for match in database

Because hash function is deterministic, same password will always result in same digest

Hashed password: 5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99

UserIDUserNameHashedPasswordKn1testuser5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99Kn2testuser15f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99val3testuser27c6a180b36896a0a8c02787eeafb0e4cval4testuser3a7303f3eee5f3ff1942bfbb1797ea0afval

Hashes match for testuser

Know user submitted valid password without storing in DB

Dictionary attack: try all words in a dictionary looking for a match

Change y password dictionar	Usernam Password our Pas if in y! Hashed pass 5f4dcc3b5aa	ne: "testus d: "passwo Hash ssword word: 765d61d8	er" ord" Assume adversary steals hashed passwords	Passwor Passwor Passwor Passwor Dictionary attack: Hash all words in a word hash matche password is "crack	rd: "aardvark" rd: "alice" rd: "anteater" rd: "password" dictionary, if s database hash, ed"
_					Will not crack
UserID	UserName	Hashed	Password		if user's
1	testuser	5f4dcc	3b5aa765d61d	8327deb882cf99	password not
2	testuser1	5f4dcc	3b5aa765d61d	8327deb882cf99	in dictionary
3	testuser2	7c6a18	30b36896a0a80	c02787eeafb0e4c	Crack one,

testuser3 a7303f3eee5f3ff1942bfbb1797ea0af crack all with same password

4

Rainbow table attacks precompute all possible character combinations

	Username: "testuser Password: "password	." d"		Password: "a" Password: "aa"
	Hash Password	Assume adversary steals hashed	Rainbow to Precompu	Password: "aaa" Password: "password" table attack: Ite all character
H 5	ashed password: f4dcc3b5aa765d61d832	passwords 27deb882cf99	combinati Store resu	ions up to certain length Ilting hash for each combo

UserID	UserName	HashedPassword	Look up database password in
1	testuser	5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99	rainbow table
2	testuser1	5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99	Lots of time and
3	testuser2	7c6a180b36896a0a8c02787eeafb0e4c	storage needed
4	testuser3	a7303f3eee5f3ff1942bfbb1797ea0af	Length limited

Use salt to prevent rainbow table attacks



Username: "testuser" Password: "password"

Password

<u>Salt:</u>

- Random string of characters appended (or prepended or both) to password before hash
- Each user gets unique salt
- Salt stored in plain text in database
- User need not know value of salt, it is added on server side



Password + **Salt**: "password.ef_ob'3" Salted hashed password: 62c21dd30b2d7e6e6671628458aeaf1f If salt is long (say 64 characters) rainbow table is impractical

62c21dd30b2d7e6e6671628458aeaf1f Dictionary attack still possible

Password plus salt unlikely to be

in dictionary

Adding salt
 to each word
 slows down
 adversary

UserID	UserName	Salt	SaltedPassword	Iľ
1	testuser	.ef_ob'3	62c21dd30b2d7e6e6671628458aeaf1f	•
2	testuser1	\s#>2!x}	a9055805cb7e588dc27945cb95067f6b	
3	testuser2	as=8KIA=	19e3385ed6bfe321b36b6bc4290bea0b	
4	testuser3	n%lzA7QQ	a6fc8f715df44839b50cf31b639b961c	

Adding pepper is even better



Username: "testuser" Password: "password"

Password

Pepper:

- **Random string of characters appended** to password + salt before hash
- Pepper kept secret, not stored in database
- **One pepper for all users**

Another variant

Pepper is one character

Password + Salt + Pepper: "password.ef_ob'3Secret" Salted hashed password: 2811922850bbcd79683b58e43d1ab76f

- Not stored
- On login, try 'a', then 'b'
 - Will eventually atch

adversary

UserID	UserName	Salt	SaltedPassword	find m
1	testuser	.ef_ob'3	62c21dd30b2d7e6e6671628458aeaf1f	Claura
2	testuser1	\s#>2!x}	a9055805cb7e588dc27945cb95067f6b	SIOWS
3	testuser2	as=8KIA=	19e3385ed6bfe321b36b6bc4290bea0b	
4	testuser3	n%lzA7QQ	a6fc8f715df44839b50cf31b639b961c	

Do not use passwords that are in the dictionary!

Exercise

Enter username and password at phony sign up site: <u>http://vibrantcloud.org/cs55/saveUser.html</u>

Site stores entries into Users table in a database

- Table has unique constraint on UserName (so choose something else if what you enter is already taken)
- NOTE: for demonstration purposes only, it stores the password in plain text! <u>You would not do this is production</u>!
- Also stores hashed and salted hash passwords

Assume an adversary does a SQL injection attack (or otherwise steals Users table) and gets usernames with hashed and salted passwords

- What can they do? They do not have the users' passwords
- Enter hashcat!

Hashcat is a password hashing tool

1. Download usertable.csv from database

2. Extract hashes from usertable.csv

cat usertable.csv | awk "-F," '{print \$4}' > unsalted.txt cat usertable.csv | awk "-F," '{print \$6 ":" \$5}' > salted.txt

-m is hash type:

• 0 = MD5

-a is attack mode

- 0 = dictionary
- 3. Crack passwords 10 = MD5(password+salt) rockyou.txt is dictionary

--potfile-disable means restart

hashcat -m 0 -a 0 unsalted.txt ~/Downloads/rockyou.txt --potfile-disable

Salted

Unsalted

hashcat -m 10 -a 0 salted.txt ~/Downloads/rockyou.txt --potfile-disable

Exercise: crack passwords on local machine

Linux stores passwords in file /etc/shadow

- Take a look at them: cat /etc/shadow
 - Hmmm, need sudo privledges (we will see how to get them via a buffer overflow attack soon)
 - Assume we have sudo rights for now
 - sudo cat /etc/shadow
- Linux stores passwords in hashed form
 - Find out what form of hashing is used: grep -A 18 ENCRYPT_METHOD /etc/login.defs
 - Edit out username and end, save as shadow1.txt
 joeyjojo:\$6\$4Lh9NoaI\$g3gJWZYhNaGC7FgiNHKci6izK5YJ7hAC9
 7LVN9tqJ07ULt0tZMyDJxQWzhBqHQ3CRsEU1ooSFx9A0ea0tac4m/÷
 18463:0:99999:7:::
- Crack with hashcat
 hashcat -m 1800 -a 0 shadow1.txt ~/Downloads/rockyou.txt
 --potfile-disable -0

Notice hashing is much slower with SHA512 than MD5!

Before next class

- 1. Complete Lab 0
- 2. Read textbook: chapter 1.1-1.6









My favorite



Discussion:

- 1. What is the difference between identification and authentication?
- 2. What are some of the problems with using passwords for authentication?
- 3. How do adversaries crack passwords?
- 4. How to choose a good password?
- 5. Should you write your passwords down?
- 6. Will passwords ever go away?